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WHO PUT THE QUO IN QUID PRO QUO?:  
WHY COURTS SHOULD APPLY MCDONNELL’S 
“OFFICIAL ACT” DEFINITION NARROWLY 
Adam F. Minchew* 
 
Federal prosecutors have several tools at their disposal to bring criminal 
charges against state and local officials for their engagement in corrupt 
activity.  Section 666 federal funds bribery and § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion, 
two such statuary tools, have coexisted for the past thirty-six years, during 
which time § 666 has seen an increasing share of total prosecutions while 
the Hobbs Act’s share of prosecutions has fallen commensurately. 
In the summer of 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. 
United States—a decision that threatens to quicken the demise of Hobbs Act 
extortion in favor of § 666.  If McDonnell is interpreted to apply to Hobbs 
Act extortion but not to § 666, we can expect the latter to become the 
unchallenged favorite of federal prosecutors as well as increased litigation 
over whether § 666 bribery contains a quid pro quo requirement.  This is 
likely to occur given § 666’s coverage of the same corrupt behavior, 
expansive jurisdictional hook, and, following McDonnell, lower difficulty of 
proving violations within some circuits.  To avoid this eventuality, lower 
courts should distinguish McDonnell because of its unique procedural 
posture and continue to apply the existing quid pro quo framework.  Before 
meaningful change to our federal bribery statutes can take place, the courts 
of appeals must first find consensus over whether and when § 666 requires 
the government to prove the existence of a quid pro quo. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 2009 to 2012, Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell accepted over 
$175,000 in gifts and loans from Jonnie Williams, the CEO of a Virginia-
based nutritional supplement company.1  At the same time, Williams sought 
state-sponsored research of a new product.2  Federal prosecutors charged 
McDonnell, and a jury found him guilty of honest services fraud and Hobbs 
Act extortion under color of official right.3  On June 27, 2016, however, a 
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court vacated McDonnell’s conviction and 
remanded due to an erroneous jury instruction regarding the meaning of 
“official act”—the quo component of a quid pro quo.4  On September 8, 
2016, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia moved 
to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.5 
In analyzing the district court’s jury instruction, the Court in McDonnell 
v. United States6 considered the elements of Hobbs Act extortion7 and 
honest services fraud8 with reference to the federal bribery statute’s9 
definition of “official act.”10  It held that an official act must be a specific, 
formal exercise of government power rather than some undefined future 
benefit.11 
Law-abiding, tax-paying citizens have long demanded that public 
officials be held to the same (or higher) standards as themselves.  Indeed, 
among Congress’s first acts after the founding was to outlaw bribery of 
customs officers and federal judges.12 
Today, there exists a patchwork of federal bribery statutes with 
overlapping criminal conduct, applicable individuals, and jurisdictional 
elements.13  Despite their differences, the primary purpose of these statutes 
is the same:  to render unlawful certain self-interested behaviors by state, 
federal, and local public officials and private individuals who receive 
federal funding.14  These statutes principally target the use of official 
government power for personal pecuniary gain, whether through bribery, 
kickbacks, extortion, or defrauding the public of honest services.15  
Determining the line between distasteful behavior and criminal behavior, 
 
 1. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 2364–67. 
 4. Id. at 2375. 
 5. Unopposed Motion to Remand for Dismissal, McDonnell v. United States, No. 15-
4019 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2016). 
 6. 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
 8. Id. §§ 1343, 1346. 
 9. Id. § 201. 
 10. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct at 2365. 
 11. Id. at 2372. 
 12. See PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC 
CORRUPTION:  THE LAW AND LEGAL STRATEGIES 3–4 (2011). 
 13. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1346, 1951–52. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1346, 1951. 
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however, has confounded prosecutors, citizens, legislators, and the courts 
for years.16 
This Note explores the possible effects that McDonnell will have on the 
quid pro quo standard for future federal prosecutions of state and local 
official corruption.17  Quid pro quo, as interpreted and defined by the 
Supreme Court, generally means “a specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act.”18  Stated simply, the 
quid is the thing of value, the quo is the official act, and the pro is the 
contemplated exchange.19  A narrow construction of any component of the 
quid pro quo will limit the range of conduct criminalized by bribery statutes 
requiring such proof.  This Note focuses almost exclusively on the nature of 
the quo (i.e., the official act) and differing standards of “official act” that 
courts have developed for specific statutes and circumstances. 
Part I presents the two federal statutes that are the focus of this Note:  
§ 666 federal funds bribery20 and § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion under color 
of official right.21  Although Congress enacted each statute independently, 
both criminalize virtually the same conduct.22  Section 666 prohibits the 
corrupt solicitation, demand, acceptance, or agreement to accept anything 
valued $5,000 or greater while intending to be influenced or rewarded in 
connection with any business of a government body or agency that receives 
$10,000 or greater in federal funds.23  Hobbs Act extortion under color of 
official right prohibits the receipt of a payment to which the recipient is not 
entitled in exchange for an agreement to perform an official act.24  
Although the criminalized conduct is substantially the same, the lower 
courts have developed divergent standards of proof, creating critical 
differences, which McDonnell brings into stark contrast. 
Part II briefly describes the birth and early life of Hobbs Act extortion.  
This part also discusses the Supreme Court’s establishment of “official 
acts” as the quo component of the quid pro quo framework developed in 
two early 1990s cases, McCormick v. United States25 and Evans v. United 
States.26  Part II.C then details the circuit court confusion over the quid pro 
quo requirement for Hobbs Act extortion following the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in McCormick and Evans, specifically the “explicit” and 
“implicit” quid pro quo requirements and when each is appropriate. 
 
 16. See infra Parts II.C, III. 
 17. The federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, is not the direct focus of this Note, 
because its quid pro quo standard is settled and its existence does not implicate the same 
federalism and vagueness concerns as § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion and § 666 federal funds 
bribery. 
 18. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999). 
 19. Id. at 404. 
 20. 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
 21. Id. § 1951.  Honest services wire fraud, the other theory of bribery that Governor 
McDonnell was alleged to have committed, falls outside the scope of this Note. 
 22. See infra Part I.C. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), (b). 
 24. See id. § 1951; Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992). 
 25. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 26. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
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Part III follows up the discussion of quid pro quo under Hobbs Act 
extortion with a discussion of quid pro quo as applied to prosecutions under 
§ 666.  Specifically, this part explores the current circuit split over whether 
the text of § 666 required proof of a quid pro quo at all.  Although the 
prosecution did not charge McDonnell with violating § 666,27 and the 
Court’s opinion does not discuss it,28 understanding how the courts of 
appeals interpret the quid pro quo requirement, or lack thereof, is crucial to 
understanding the potential reach of McDonnell. 
With an understanding of the pre-McDonnell quid pro quo requirements 
for Hobbs Act extortion, Part IV introduces the underlying facts, procedural 
history, and analysis used by the Supreme Court in McDonnell. 
In Part V, this Note presents the range of possible interpretations of 
McDonnell by the lower courts.  On one end of the spectrum, McDonnell 
can read narrowly as applying only to § 201 federal bribery and not to 
Hobbs Act extortion.29  Another reasonable interpretation is that 
McDonnell’s “official act” definition applies to Hobbs Act extortion but not 
to § 666.30  On the other end of the spectrum, McDonnell can be read 
broadly as requiring a heightened definition of “official act” that applies 
equally to all federal antibribery statutes, including § 666.31 
Finally, in Part VI, this Note takes the position that the lower courts 
should distinguish McDonnell on its facts and procedural history to give the 
Supreme Court time to clarify the quid pro quo standard, if any, applicable 
to § 666.  Despite the Court’s concerns that a weaker standard raises 
regarding fair notice, federalism, due process, and overzealous prosecution, 
the danger and likelihood that McDonnell is applied to Hobbs Act extortion 
but not to § 666 is a more pernicious long-term problem.  Application of a 
specific official act requirement to Hobbs Act extortion but not to § 666 
would result in two statutes that criminalize the same conduct but have 
substantively different required elements—a result that neither Congress 
nor the Supreme Court could have intended.  Such a result would 
necessarily demote Hobbs Act extortion and promote § 666, as prosecutors 
would be given an obvious advantage in § 666 prosecutions. 
I.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
OF FEDERAL EXTORTION AND BRIBERY 
To understand the impact of McDonnell on federal prosecution of state 
and local official corruption, it is necessary to understand the statutory 
underpinnings of § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right32 
and § 666 federal funds bribery.33 
 
 27. See generally Indictment, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 
2014) (No. 3:14-CR-00012-JRS), 2014 WL 223601. 
 28. See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct 2355 (2016). 
 29. See infra Part V.C. 
 30. See infra Part V.B. 
 31. See infra Part V.A. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2) (2012). 
 33. Id. § 666. 
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A.  Hobbs Act Extortion:  18 U.S.C. § 1951 
Congress enacted § 1951, colloquially known as the Hobbs Act34 (“the 
Act”) in honor of its sponsor, Alabama Senator Sam Hobbs, in 1946 in an 
effort to control racketeering.35  As implied by its statutory title—
“Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence”—Congress passed 
the Hobbs Act to prohibit interference with interstate commerce by either 
robbery or extortion involving the use or threatened use of force.36  As 
Senator Hobbs noted, the common law meaning of extortion was well 
understood at the time of the Act’s passage; it had been “construed a 
thousand times by the courts.”37  Nevertheless, the Act specifically defines 
“extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, 
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or 
under color of official right.”38  The Act carries a statutory maximum 
twenty-year prison sentence.39 
In the 1960s, prosecutors began trying to extend the Hobbs Act’s 
definition of extortion not only to racketeering involving physical threats 
and violence but also to the solicitation and acceptance of bribes by public 
officials.40  Courts initially rejected the notion that officials were guilty of 
extortion under color of official right when the payor’s actions were willful 
and voluntary, as in traditional bribery.41 
Beginning in 1972, however, coinciding with public outcry over official 
corruption in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal,42 Hobbs Act extortion 
under color of official right went from being ignored to transforming into 
federal prosecutors’ preferred tool for charging local officials with 
corruption.43  Federal prosecutors in New Jersey successfully employed 
Hobbs Act extortion to prosecute public corruption for the first time in 
 
 34. Ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951). 
 35. See Jeremy N. Gayed, “Corruptly”:  Why Corrupt State of Mind Is an Essential 
Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1731, 1752 (2003); see also Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of 
State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 128–29 (2003); Francis N. MacDonald, Federal 
Jurisdiction and the Hobbs Act:  United States v. Stillo and the Depletion of Assets Theory, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1393 (1997). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 37. MacDonald, supra note 35, at 1393 n.18. 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). 
 39. Id. § 1951(a). 
 40. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 277 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 41. See id. at 277–78; see also United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir. 
1971); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1965). 
 42. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:  
Someone to Watch over Us, 31 HARV. J. LEGIS. 153, 164 n.40 (1994). 
 43. See Henning, supra note 35, at 130–31; see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 
255, 290 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Hobbs Act serves “as the engine 
for a stunning expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by 
state and local laws—acts of public corruption by state and local officials”); Jan Hoth Uzzo, 
Federal Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act:  The Second 
Circuit Attempts to Define Inducement, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 734, 736 (1985). 
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United States v. Kenny.44  The Third Circuit accepted the prosecution’s 
theory of extortion under color of official right as “the wrongful taking by a 
public officer of money not due him or his office, whether or not the taking 
was accomplished by force, threats or use of fear.”45  The prosecution, 
district court, and Third Circuit on appeal relied on a disjunctive reading of 
the statute, in which “under color of official right” is construed as being 
disconnected from the preceding language—“force, violence, or fear.”46  At 
the time it was first used in Kenny, Hobbs Act extortion under color of 
official right had no specific quid pro quo requirement and carried a 
maximum penalty of twenty years.47  Thus, the stage was set for the rise of 
a statute that, since 1984, has served as the lead charge in 1,629 federal 
prosecutions of state and local official corruption—more than 20 percent of 
all federal prosecutions of such conduct by state and local officials.48 
B.  Federal Funds Bribery:  18 U.S.C. § 666 
Congress enacted the Federal Funds Bribery and Theft Act in 198449 in 
anticipation of a pending Supreme Court case addressing whether the then-
existing federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, applied to state and local 
officials.50  Unlike the Hobbs Act, which derives its federal jurisdiction 
from the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
Constitution,51 federal jurisdiction under § 666 is grounded in the Spending 
Clause.52  The statute sweeps broadly to cover all local officials whose 
departments receive $10,000 or more in federal funds;53 the Supreme Court 
 
 44. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972); see also id. at 1229; JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 586 
(1984) (“Kenny . . . amend[ed] the Hobbs Act and [brought] into existence a new crime—
local bribery affecting interstate commerce.  Hereafter, for purposes of Hobbs Act 
prosecutions, such bribery was to be called extortion.  The federal policing of state 
corruption had begun.”). 
 45. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229. 
 46. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970)); see also McCormick, 500 U.S. at 266 & 
n.5.  One commentator has described this as the moment where the federal bribery statute 
and Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right began to merge. See John S. Gawey, 
The Hobbs Leviathan:  The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs Act and Other Corruption 
Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 398 (2011). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); see Lee J. Radek, Hobbs Act, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC 
CORRUPTION CASES 413, 419–20 (1988), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/ 
110010-110033NCJRS.pdf (stating that Hobbs Act extortion “punishes activity with a 20-
year maximum sentence which, if engaged in by Federal officials and prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. § 201, would be punishable by fifteen years for bribery or two years for gratuity”) 
[https://perma.cc/U5QN-CJJL]. 
 48. Adam Minchew, Corruption Prosecution Data Compilation from Tracfed.com (Nov. 
2, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (compiling all federal § 666 and Hobbs Act 
bribery prosecutions from 1986 to 2016). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1104, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 666). 
 50. See Justin Weitz, The Devil Is in the Details:  18 U.S.C. § 666 After Skilling v. 
United States, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 805, 816 (2011). 
 51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 52. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). 
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has held that “[n]o connection whatsoever between the corrupt transaction 
and the federal benefits need be shown.”54 
The statute’s prohibitions reach any “agent of an organization, or of a 
State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof.”55  
Moreover, § 666 expressly criminalizes both the offer and acceptance of a 
bribe.56  The text of the statute contains no quid pro quo requirement nor 
does it contain the phrase “official act.”57  With respect to the recipient of a 
bribe, the statute provides: 
Whoever . . . corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, 
or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, 
intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or 
agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; . . . shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.58 
C.  Contrasting § 666 and Hobbs Act Extortion 
Whereas the courts developed the Hobbs Act theory of bribery over time 
based on policy and reference to the common law,59 § 666 is unmistakably 
the will of Congress and is undergirded by a detailed statutory framework 
less subject to judicial interpretation.60  Despite their differences, the two 
statutes criminalize substantially the same conduct.61  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court in Evans noted that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right 
is the “rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a 
bribe.’”62  One commenter has added that the conduct criminalized by 
§ 666 in 1984, at least with respect to public officials, was “more than 
adequately covered by official right extortion under the Hobbs Act.”63 
Until recently, an important difference between Hobbs Act extortion 
under color of official right and § 666 bribery was the ability of prosecutors 
to charge the bribe payor—in addition to the official accepting the bribe—
under § 666 but not under the Hobbs Act.  In the summer of 2016, the 
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split on this issue.  Decided just months 
before McDonnell, the Court in Ocasio v. United States64 reaffirmed that 
Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right embodies common law 
extortion and includes the “rough equivalent of what we would now 
 
 54. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 613. 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1). 
 56. Id. § 666(a)(1)–(2). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. § 666(a)(1)(B). 
 59. See Gawey, supra note 46, at 405. 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
 61. See H. Marshall Jarrett, Charging Decisions, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC 
CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 47, at 209, 213 (“A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 can be 
charged in conjunction with the Hobbs Act if the jurisdictional requirement of receipt of a 
specified amount of Federal funds by the official’s employer is met.”). 
 62. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992). 
 63. See Gawey, supra note 46, at 410. 
 64. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016). 
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describe as ‘taking a bribe.’”65  The petitioner specifically argued that 
permitting conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion is “tantamount to a 
charge of soliciting or accepting a bribe and that allowing such a charge 
undermines 18 U.S.C. § 666.”66  The Court, however, could find “no 
principled basis for precluding the prosecution of conspirac[y] to commit” 
Hobbs Act extortion while conspiracy to commit bribery under existing 
federal statutes was permitted.67  It thus held that a civilian bribe payor—
not just the bribed official—could be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act and 
convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion “under color of official 
right.”68 
Justice Thomas, however, alluded in his dissent that Evans was wrongly 
decided.69  He asserted that the majority’s opinion “blurr[ed] the distinction 
between bribery and extortion.”70  Thus, in holding that bribe payors are 
subject to prosecution under Hobbs Act extortion, Ocasio eroded a central 
distinction between Hobbs Act extortion and § 666 federal bribery. 
The remaining difference between the two statutes is the difficulty of 
proving a violation.  Whereas the Supreme Court has established and 
interpreted the quid pro quo framework for Hobbs Act extortion with a 
degree of clarity and consensus,71 neither Congress nor the Supreme Court 
has explicitly addressed whether proof of a quid pro quo is necessary in 
§ 666 prosecutions.72  The required showing of a promised or performed 
“official act”73 in the former and the “corrupt solicitation” of a “reward[] in 
connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions”74 in the 
latter is crucial.  Because “official act” has taken on a very specific 
meaning, § 666’s lack of the term is of unique importance.75 
II.  HOBBS ACT EXTORTION:  QUID PRO QUO? 
In the aftermath of Kenny, the courts of appeals largely adopted the Third 
Circuit’s “wrongful taking” framework.76  A majority of them, including 
 
 65. Id. at 1428 (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 260). 
 66. Id. at 1434. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1436. 
 69. Id. at 1439 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation has 
“wrenche[d] from the States the presumptive control that they should have over their own 
officials’ wrongdoing”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 72. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 73. See infra Part II.B. 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 75. Another important difference between the two statutes is their applicability.  
Whereas only those who hold public office can be prosecuted under Hobbs Act extortion, 
prosecutors can employ § 666 to charge private citizens if their organization or business 
receives the statutorily required $10,000 in federal funds. See id. § 666(b).  For the purposes 
of this Note, which focuses on federal prosecution of state and local government corruption, 
however, this difference is of little importance. 
 76. See Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or Campaign Contributions?:  The 
Ambiguous Prosecution of “Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the Federal Funds Bribery 
Statute, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 234 n.35 (2012) (citing United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 
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the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Evans,77 ruled that Hobbs Act 
extortion under color of official right is “consonant with the common law 
definition of extortion” and, therefore, “[t]he coercive element [of the 
crime] is supplied by the existence of the public office itself.”78  Thus, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that “passive acceptance of a benefit by a public 
official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation.”79  The 
Second Circuit, however, strayed from the majority position by reading the 
language of the Hobbs Act more narrowly to require 
“induce[ment] . . . under color of official right”—a criminal wrong 
“begin[ning] with the public official, not with the gratuitous actions of 
another.”80  Soon after, the Ninth Circuit employed a similar statutory 
construction and joined the Second Circuit in establishing a heightened 
inducement standard.81  This conflict over inducement led to back-to-back 
decisions in the early 1990s, which redefined Hobbs Act extortion. 
A.  McCormick v. United States:  Is Proof of a Quid Pro Quo 
Necessary for Hobbs Act Extortion Convictions? 
In the 1991 case of McCormick v. United States,82 the Supreme Court 
issued its first major opinion concerning Hobbs Act extortion under color of 
official right.  Although the Court declined to resolve the circuit split 
regarding whether a federal prosecutor must prove some affirmative act of 
inducement by an official,83 it did resolve the threshold question of whether 
and when proof of a quid pro quo is a required element of Hobbs Act 
extortion.84 
Robert McCormick, a West Virginia state legislator, sponsored a bill 
permitting doctors with foreign medical degrees to temporarily practice 
 
578, 595 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Butler, 
618 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320–21 (10th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
 77. 910 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 78. Id. at 796 (quoting Williams, 621 F.2d at 124); see also United States v. Garner, 837 
F.2d 1404, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1274–75 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
 79. Evans, 910 F.2d at 796 (stating that the official must know “that he is being offered 
the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power . . . [and] 
need not take any specific action to induce the offering of the benefit”). 
 80. United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 686–87, 691 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“The 
conduct proscribed by the Hobbs Act is the wrongful use of public office, not merely the 
acceptance of benefits.”). 
 81. See United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 82. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 83. Id. at 266 n.5 (“The conflict on this issue is clear, but this case is not the occasion to 
resolve it.”).  The district court instructed the jury that 
inducement can be in the overt form of a demand, or in a more subtle form such as 
custom or expectation. . . .  Extortion under color of official right does not require 
proof of specific acts by the public official demonstrating force, threats, or the use 
of fear so long as the victim consented because of the office or position held by the 
official. 
Id. at 261 n.4. 
 84. Id. at 273. 
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medicine in the state.85  While campaigning for reelection in 1984, 
McCormick explained to the doctors’ representative that “his campaign was 
expensive, that he had paid considerable sums out of his own pocket, and 
that he had not heard anything from the foreign doctors.”86  Shortly 
thereafter, McCormick received the first of five cash payments totaling 
several thousand dollars, none of which he disclosed as campaign 
contributions as required by West Virginia law.87 
Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld McCormick’s conviction, 
including his violation of the Hobbs Act, it noted the difficulty inherent in 
“articulating a standard” to distinguish legitimate campaign contributions 
from extorted money.88  Nevertheless, the circuit court articulated seven 
factors relevant to determining the legitimacy of campaign contributions.89  
Based on these factors, it found that there was sufficient evidence that the 
payments were extorted and, thus, that an explicit quid pro quo was not 
required for a conviction under the Hobbs Act in the campaign contribution 
context.90 
The Supreme Court rebuked the Fourth Circuit and reversed 
McCormick’s conviction.91  It held that Hobbs Act extortion under color of 
official right in the campaign contribution context requires a specific quid 
pro quo—a payment “made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking 
by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”92  In reaching 
this decision, the Supreme Court reflected on the unique role of elections in 
a democracy:  “to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion 
when they act for the benefit of constituents . . . shortly before or after 
 
 85. Id. at 259–60. 
 86. Id. at 260. 
 87. Id. 
 88. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 500 U.S. 257.  
The difficultly of the decision was due in part to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which held that campaign contributions are a legitimate and 
necessary part of democracy. See id. at 21; ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 217 
(2014) (“Creating laws that deter bribery of legislators, but do not deter democratic 
organizing, has been among the most vexing problems of the American political 
experiment.”). 
 89. McCormick, 896 F.2d at 66 (“Some of the circumstances that should be considered 
in making this determination include, but are not limited to, (1) whether the money was 
recorded by the payor as a campaign contribution, (2) whether the money was recorded and 
reported by the official as a campaign contribution, (3) whether the payment was in cash, (4) 
whether it was delivered to the official personally or to his campaign, (5) whether the official 
acted in his official capacity at or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or 
supported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the official had supported 
similar legislation before the time of the payment, and (7) whether the official had directly or 
indirectly solicited the payor individually for the payment.”). 
 90. Id. (“[I]f payments to elected officials are not treated as legitimate campaign 
contributions by either the payor or the official, then a jury may reasonably infer that these 
payments are also induced by the official’s office in violation of the Hobbs Act.  Otherwise, 
unless there was an explicit quid pro quo promise, elected officials could avoid the Hobbs 
Act merely by calling the money ‘campaign contributions.’”). 
 91. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 269 (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ opinion did not examine or 
mention the instructions given by the trial court.”). 
 92. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
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campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, 
is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant” when it 
codified Hobbs Act extortion.93 
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens attacked the “explicit promise” 
requirement handed down by the majority.94  He argued, “Subtle extortion 
is just as wrongful—and probably much more common—than the kind of 
express understanding that the Court’s opinion seems to require.”95 
Notably, the Court punted on two sources of circuit splits concerning the 
Act:  First, whether and how proof of a quid pro quo applies outside of the 
campaign contribution context.96  Second, whether or not inducement on 
the part of the official is a necessary element of Hobbs Act extortion under 
color of official right.97 
B.  Evans v. United States:  
Clarifying the Quid Pro Quo Standard? 
Less than two weeks after it decided McCormick, the Supreme Court was 
given a proverbial “second bite at the apple.”  It swiftly granted certiorari to 
clarify the circuit split over whether prosecutors must prove some 
affirmative act of inducement, beyond holding an official office, to be 
found guilty of Hobbs Act extortion—an issue it left unresolved in 
McCormick.98 
Petitioner John Evans was elected to the Board of Commissioners of 
DeKalb County, Georgia.99  As part of an investigation into public 
corruption, the FBI initiated conversations with Evans in which agents 
requested that he assist in the acquisition of favorable zoning decisions.100  
Evans accepted some $7,000 in cash and a $1,000 check, payable to his 
campaign, from an undercover FBI agent.101  He reported the check in his 
campaign finance disclosure but failed to disclose the $7,000 in cash.102 
On the inducement issue, the Supreme Court sided with the majority of 
circuits, holding that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right does 
not require inducement by the public official;103 the coercive element is 
 
 93. Id. at 272 (writing that “so long as election campaigns are financed by private 
contributions,” any other interpretation of the Hobbs Act is untenable). 
 94. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 268 (majority opinion) “McCormick does not challenge any rulings of the 
courts below with respect to the application of the Hobbs Act to payments made . . . to 
elected officials that are properly determined not to be campaign contributions.” Id.  “[W]e 
do not decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists in other contexts, such as when an 
elected official receiv[ed] gifts, meals, travel expenses, or other items of value.” Id. at 274 
n.10. 
 97. Id. at 266 n.5. 
 98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 99. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 265 (“The statute merely requires of the public official that he obtain ‘property 
from another, with his consent, . . . under color of official right.’”); see also Linda 
2017] WHO PUT THE QUO IN QUID PRO QUO? 1805 
provided by the existence of the public office itself.104  In so holding, the 
Court both imbued Hobbs Act extortion with common law extortion105 and 
likened Hobbs Act extortion to bribery.106 
But the Court went further than just deciding the narrow issue of 
inducement; the Evans decision’s lack of clarity on the quid pro quo 
requirement for Hobbs Act extortion would prove critical, as it provided 
fodder for disunity in the courts of appeals.107  The majority held that 
Hobbs Act extortion occurs when “the public official receives a payment in 
return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the 
quid pro quo is not an element of the offense.”108  In the same paragraph, 
however, the Court rephrased its holding, critically omitting the adjective 
“specific” used earlier to describe the “official act”:  the Court held that 
“the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a 
payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made 
in return for official acts.”109 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence muddies the quid pro quo waters by 
embracing, or at least lending support for, the majority’s nonspecific 
holding regarding official acts.  Critically, Justice Kennedy wrote that the 
official and the payor “need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for 
otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and 
nods.”110  In addition, Justice Kennedy makes clear something that the 
majority did not:  that “the rationale underlying the Court’s holding [that 
quid pro quo is an element of Hobbs Act extortion] applies not only in 
campaign contribution cases, but in all § 1951 prosecutions.”111  This 
statement would be clearer if the majority, concurrence, or dissent had 
overtly discussed the case’s unique mix of personal and campaign 
contributions.112  Because none of the opinions discussed the implications 
of this mix, the extent to which the decision is applicable to situations not 
involving campaign contributions is murky.113  The language and concerns 
 
Greenhouse, Court Upholds Widened Use of U.S. Extortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/27/us/court-upholds-widened-use-of-us-extortion-
law.html [https://perma.cc/L8AG-FX4N]. 
 104. Evans, 504 U.S. at 265. 
 105. Id. at 263 (“Although the present statutory text is much broader than the common-
law definition of extortion because it encompasses conduct by a private individual as well as 
conduct by a public official, the portion of the statute that refers to official misconduct 
continues to mirror the common-law definition.”). 
 106. Id. at 260 (describing Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right as the “rough 
equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe’”). 
 107. See infra Part II.C. 
 108. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 274 (second emphasis added) (“The inducement from the official is criminal if 
it is express or if it is implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so 
and the payor so interprets it.” (emphasis added)). 
 111. Id. at 278. 
 112. See id. at 257–58 (stating that the defendant was given $7,000 in cash and a $1,000 
campaign contribution by check). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
whether Evans applies outside the campaign contribution context); United States v. Hairston, 
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expressed in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion have had a lasting effect 
on quid pro quo standards and have led to a battle of interpretations by the 
lower courts over which “holding” in the majority opinion should be 
applied.114 
In the twenty-page dissent—three pages longer than the majority opinion 
itself—Justice Thomas, joined by Justices William Rehnquist and Antonin 
Scalia, argued that Congress did not intend to codify common law extortion 
“under color of official right” when it passed the Hobbs Act in 1946.115  
Justice Thomas also expressed serious federalism concerns116 and reiterated 
that McCormick’s holding was “expressly limited” to the campaign 
contribution context.117 
Thus, disagreement within the courts of appeals on Hobbs Act extortion’s 
quid pro quo requirement could be predicted from the Evans opinion itself.  
The majority’s position—embracing both “official acts” and “specific 
official acts”—lacked clarity.118  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence declared 
that a quid pro quo must be proven in all Hobbs Act extortion cases but that 
the promise to perform need not be “express.”119  And Justice Thomas’s 
dissent suggested the majority extended McCormick’s specific quid pro quo 
requirement to all cases of Hobbs Act extortion.120 
C.  Circuit Confusion over the Hobbs Act’s Extortion 
Quid Pro Quo Requirement After Evans v. United States:  
What Does “Official Act” Mean? 
Due to the uncertain scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McCormick and its fractured opinion in Evans, confusion over whether and 
when Hobbs Act extortion requires specific official acts was inevitable.  
Two issues developed:  (1) whether Evans requires a quid pro quo as an 
element of Hobbs Act extortion outside of the campaign contribution 
context and (2) assuming it does, whether McCormick’s requirement that 
the quid pro quo be specific applies only in the campaign contribution 
context. 
 
46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that Evans “required proof of a quid pro quo 
because it involved campaign contributions” (emphasis added)). 
 114. See infra Part II.C. 
 115. Evans, 504 U.S. at 281 (“[T]he critical inquiry for our purposes is the American 
understanding of the crime at the time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.”). 
 116. Id. at 290. 
 117. Id. at 287 (“[W]e do not decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists in other 
contexts, such as when an elected official receives gifts, meals, travel expenses, or other 
items of value.” (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 n.10 (1991))). 
 118. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 119. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274. 
 120. Id. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Today’s extension of McCormick’s . . . quid pro 
quo limitation to all cases of official extortion is both unexplained and inexplicable . . . .”). 
2017] WHO PUT THE QUO IN QUID PRO QUO? 1807 
1.  Is a Quid Pro Quo Showing Required 
in All Hobbs Act Extortion Prosecutions? 
Immediately following Evans, a number of courts of appeals questioned 
whether any quid pro quo showing was necessary to prove Hobbs Act 
extortion outside the campaign contribution context.  As recently as 2001, 
for example, the Third Circuit held that Supreme Court precedent “does not 
require a quid pro quo for extortion outside the context of campaign 
contributions.”121 
In United States v. Blandford,122 Judge David Nelson of the Sixth 
Circuit, in a concurring opinion, struggled to understand the effect of 
McCormick and Evans outside the campaign context.123  After surveying 
the cases, he concluded that “[e]ven outside the campaign contribution 
context . . . the quid pro quo requirements can be satisfied only where the 
payment has been accepted in exchange for a ‘specific’ official act or a 
‘specific’ requested exercise of official power.”124  In reaching this 
conclusion, Judge Nelson noted that there was “no reason to doubt that the 
‘official acts’ referred to in the last sentence [of Evans] were the ‘specific 
official acts’ referred to earlier.”125  Thus, it was unclear from the beginning 
how these cases should be interpreted and applied in various situations.126 
2.  Most Courts of Appeals Adopt a Two-Tiered Approach 
to the Quid Pro Quo Requirement 
Over time, the courts of appeals relied on Justice Kennedy’s “winks and 
nods” concurrence as sufficient authority to find that Evans established a 
relaxed standard outside the campaign contribution context, even though 
 
 121. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Jarrett, supra 
note 61, at 213 (“One advantage of the Hobbs Act is that the prosecution need not prove that 
the public official performed an official act as a quid pro quo for the property given to the 
public official.”). 
 122. 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 123. Id. at 713 (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id.; see also United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the Supreme Court had not decided the quid pro quo question outside of the 
campaign context, and assuming without deciding that a quid pro quo was required in all 
Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions); United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 
1995) (holding that although the Supreme Court’s decisions did not resolve the issue, a quid 
pro quo must be proven in all Hobbs Act extortion cases); United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 
108, 109 (11th Cir. 1994) (reiterating that “an explicit promise by a public official to act or 
not act is an essential element of Hobbs Act extortion”); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 
543, 552–54 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing Hobbs Act extortion conviction where trial court 
erroneously interpreted Evans and McCormick as requiring a quid pro quo jury instruction 
only in “instances of extortion under color of official right involving campaign 
contributions”). 
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proof of a quid pro quo is always necessary.127  In United States v. 
Garcia,128 the Second Circuit described this view succinctly: 
Although the McCormick Court has ruled that extortion under color of 
official right in circumstances involving campaign contributions occurs 
“only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or 
undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act,” 
Evans modified this standard in non-campaign contribution cases by 
requiring that the government show only “that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the 
payment was made in return for official acts.”129 
Using this analysis, most courts of appeals have developed standards of 
implicit quid pro quo outside the campaign context.130  Known as the 
“stream of benefits” or “as opportunities arise” theory, this implicit standard 
does not require the contemplation of a specific official action at the time 
the agreement is made.131  For this reason, the stream of benefits theory has 
been criticized for “invit[ing] slippage” from a quid pro quo standard to a 
“‘one hand washes the other’ or ‘favoritism’ standard.”132 
The Second Circuit detailed the approach in United States v. Ganim.133  
In an opinion written by then-Judge Sotomayor, the court upheld the 
conviction of the former Mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut, who accepted 
payment in return for an agreement to secure the payor a government 
contract.134  Ganim challenged the jury instruction, which provided that 
“[t]he government does not have to prove an explicit promise to perform a 
particular act made at the time of payment.”135  Instead, the district court 
instructed that “it is sufficient if the defendant understood he was expected 
as a result of the payment to exercise particular kinds of influence . . . as 
specific opportunities arose.”136  The court reiterated that such a standard is 
the “natural corollary of Evans’ pronouncement that the government need 
not prove the existence of an explicit agreement at the time a payment is 
received.”137  Indeed, the court found that the defendant’s proposed 
definition of “official act”—something “identified and directly linked to a 
benefit at the time the benefit is received”—went too far.138  Critically, the 
 
 127. United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 
Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382, 385 (4th 
Cir. 1993). 
 128. 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 129. Id. at 414 (first quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991); then 
quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)). 
 130. See George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption:  With a 
Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 177, 218–19 (2015). 
 131. Id. at 217. 
 132. Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption:  Why Broad Definitions of Bribery Make 
Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 481 (2015). 
 133. 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 134. Id. at 137–38. 
 135. Id. at 144 (quoting United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 136. Id. (quoting Coyne, 4 F.3d at 114). 
 137. Id. at 145 (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)). 
 138. Id. 
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court understood the term “official act” to mean “an act taken under color 
of official authority, not necessarily as the term is used and statutorily 
defined in . . . § 201 or elsewhere.”139  The Fourth Circuit, in United States 
v. Jefferson,140 relied on Ganim in holding that bribery, including Hobbs 
Act extortion, “can be accomplished through an ongoing course of 
conduct.”141 
In United States v. Abbey,142 the Sixth Circuit noted that “not all quid pro 
quos are made of the same stuff” and thus, outside of the campaign 
contribution context, “the elements of extortion are satisfied by something 
short of a formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual 
arrangement.”143  The court justified this implicit quid pro quo standard by 
noting that “there is no reason to impose a judicial requirement . . . that 
would make it lawful under the Hobbs Act to pay a public official to exert 
his influence in your favor, so long as it is premature for the agreement to 
contemplate specific acts.”144  Thus, the court held that “it is sufficient if 
the public official understood that he or she was expected to exercise some 
influence on the payor’s behalf as opportunities arose.”145 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has held a conviction for extortion under color 
of official right, whether in the campaign or noncampaign contribution 
context, requires that the government prove a quid pro quo.146  In the 
noncampaign contribution context, however, “[a]n explicit quid pro quo is 
not required; an agreement implied from the official’s words and actions is 
sufficient to satisfy this element.”147 
As these cases demonstrate, despite the confusion surrounding the 
meaning of Evans and McCormick, a majority of the courts of appeals have 
coalesced around a two-tiered quid pro quo standard in which the quo 
component of the quid pro quo is relaxed outside the campaign contribution 
context. 
III.  SECTION 666:  QUID PRO QUO? 
While the preceding discussion helps to explain how courts understand 
bribery and quid pro quo as they relate to Hobbs Act extortion, a brief 
 
 139. Id. at 142 n.4.  In so doing, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 
398 (1999), should apply to Hobbs Act extortion or federal funds bribery.  For a more 
thorough discussion of these cases distinguishing § 666 from the Court’s analysis in Sun-
Diamond, see Jared W. Olen, The Devil’s in the Intent:  Does 18 U.S.C. § 666 Require Proof 
of Quid-Pro-Quo Intent?, 42 SW. L. REV. 229, 251–54 (2012). 
 140. 674 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 141. Id. (quoting Ganim, 510 F.3d at 149).  After Governor McDonnell’s trial, the district 
court relied on Jefferson in upholding the jury instruction. United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. 
Supp. 3d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016). 
 142. 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 143. Id. at 517–18. 
 144. Id. at 518. 
 145. Id. (emphasis added). 
 146. See United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 147. Id. 
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detour into the text and judicial construction of § 201 bribery is necessary 
before we can make sense of the § 666 case law.148  Part III.A discusses the 
relevant background on § 201.  Next, Part III.B explores those courts that 
have found § 666 to require proof of a quid pro quo.  Then, Part III.C 
discusses those courts that have held that § 666 requires no quid pro quo 
showing. 
A.  A Brief Detour into the Federal Bribery Statute:  § 201 
As previously stated, Hobbs Act extortion’s quid pro quo requirement 
has been defined by the Supreme Court with reference to the term “official 
act,”149 whereas § 666 makes no mention of “official act” or of a quid pro 
quo requirement more generally.150  Because § 201 provides a detailed 
statutory scheme, has had the benefit of time and several Supreme Court 
interpretations, and encompasses bribery just like § 666, cases interpreting 
§ 201 are used by litigants and the courts to help understand both § 666 and 
Hobbs Act extortion.151 
Section 201 criminalizes the receipt of bribes for those “acting for or on 
the behalf of the United States.”152  Thus, unlike § 666, § 201 is not 
applicable to state and local officials.  The statute defines “official act” as 
“any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be 
brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in 
such official’s place of trust or profit.”153 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Evans and McCormick and 
the implicit quid pro quo standard for Hobbs Act extortion that followed, 
some courts in the 1990s construed § 201 as requiring only a weak quid pro 
quo that could be satisfied “so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of 
conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a 
pattern of official actions favorable to the donor.’”154  The Supreme Court 
put this interpretation to rest in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of 
California.155  In a decision that mentioned neither Evans nor McCormick, 
 
 148. One commentator has noted that “the Hobbs Act . . . and § 666 have swallowed 
§ 201” and thus, they should require the same state of mind. Gawey, supra note 46, at 419.  
As this Note explores, this statement may oversimplify a complex issue. See infra Part V. 
 149. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 58. 
 151. See e.g., United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Sun-
Diamond should be limited to § 201 because that statute’s specific text—“‘for or because of 
any official act’—led the Court to conclude that a direct nexus was required to sustain a 
conviction under § 201” (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 
398, 406 (1999))); United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 210 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
§ 666 and § 201 “differ[] in significant respects,” including that “Section 201 lacks an 
explicit intent requirement as to recipients of alleged bribes while Section 666 contains 
one”). 
 152. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012). 
 153. Id. § 201(a)(3). 
 154. United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United 
States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)); see Garcia, supra note 76, at 239–43. 
 155. 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
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Sun-Diamond primarily resolved a question regarding § 201’s treatment of 
bribery and gratuities.156  The lower court instructed the jury that “[t]he 
government need not prove that the alleged gratuity was linked to a specific 
or identifiable official act or any act at all.”157 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia analyzed § 201’s definition of 
“official act.”158  The Court concluded that “for bribery there must be a 
quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in 
exchange for an official act.”159  Thus, the Court held that within the 
meaning of § 201, an “official act” requires “that some particular official 
act be identified and proved.”160  While potentially applicable to all 
antibribery statutes,161 the decision can also be read more narrowly to apply 
only to § 201.162 
After Sun-Diamond, defendants argued with success in some circuits that 
a quid pro quo requirement should apply in § 666 cases as well. 
B.  Circuits Requiring a Quid Pro Quo in § 666 Prosecutions 
The Second,163 Fourth,164 Eighth165, and Eleventh166 Circuits have found 
that § 666 requires at least an implicit “stream of benefits” quid pro quo.167  
In United States v. Jennings,168 the Fourth Circuit analyzed the “corrupt 
intent” requirement under § 666 by referring to § 201.169  Invoking the 
Supreme Court’s differentiation between illegal bribes and illegal gratuities 
in Sun-Diamond, the Fourth Circuit held that a bribe under § 666 requires 
proof of payment made in exchange for an official act.170  It concluded that 
the “corrupt” element in § 666 requires the government to prove a 
“relatively specific quid pro quo”171 but stated that the “quid pro quo 
 
 156. See id. at 404. 
 157. Id. at 413–14. 
 158. Id. at 404. 
 159. Id. at 404–05. 
 160. Id. at 406. 
 161. See Gawey, supra note 46, at 415 & n.208. 
 162. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414 (“We hold that, in order to establish a violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), [the gratuity provision,] the Government must prove a link 
between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or 
because of which it was given.”).  Courts have held “that Sun-Diamond [does not] require[] 
us to define the crime of bribery narrowly [because it] says nothing about bribery.”  United 
States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 151 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 163. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 164. United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 165. United States v. Redzic, 627 F.3d 683, 692 (8th Cir. 2010) (relying on Ganim and 
Jennings, and upholding a § 666 conviction because “an illegal bribe may be paid with the 
intent to influence a general course of conduct” and the government need not “link any 
particular payment to any particular action”). 
 166. United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying Evans 
and McCormick to § 666 and holding that an “official must agree to take or forego some 
specific action in order for the doing of it to be criminal under § 666”). 
 167. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 168. 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 169. Id. at 1012–13. 
 170. Id. at 1013. 
 171. Id. at 1020 n.5. 
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requirement is satisfied so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of conduct 
of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of 
official actions favorable to the donor’” and “the intended exchange in 
bribery can be ‘this for these’ or ‘these for these,’ not just ‘this for that.’”172 
In Ganim, the Second Circuit similarly held that § 666 bribery requires a 
quid pro quo173 but found that, like Hobbs Act extortion, it “can be 
accomplished through an ongoing course of conduct, so long as evidence 
shows that the ‘favors and gifts flowing to a public official [are] in 
exchange for a pattern of official acts favorable to the donor.’”174 
C.  Circuits with No Quid Pro Quo Requirement 
At present, a number of courts of appeals do not require proof of a quid 
pro quo to be convicted of § 666 federal bribery.175  In United States v. 
Abbey,176 the Sixth Circuit examined the text of § 666 and determined that 
it “says nothing of a quid pro quo requirement to sustain a conviction, 
express or otherwise.”177  In doing so, the court approved of the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in Ganim, to the extent that “Sun-Diamond’s heightened 
[(i.e., explicit)] quid pro quo standard is inapplicable to . . . § 666 [because 
it is a] markedly different statute[].”178 
In United States v. Garrido,179 the Ninth Circuit agreed that the need for 
a limiting principle—which drove the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sun-
Diamond with respect to § 201—is not present with respect to § 666, 
“because § 666 contains both a corrupt intent requirement and a 
requirement that the illegal gift or bribe be worth over $5,000.”180  
Moreover, unlike § 201, the plain text of § 666 “makes no mention of an 
‘official act’ or a requirement that anything be given in exchange or return 
for an official act.”181  Thus, because § 666 “does not define or even use the 
term ‘official act,’”182 it “does not require a jury to find a specific quid pro 
quo.”183 
In United States v. McNair,184 the Eleventh Circuit similarly discovered 
that “nothing in the plain language of [§ 666] requires that a specific 
 
 172. Id. at 1014 (quoting United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)). 
 173. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 174. Id. at 149 (quoting Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1014); see also United States v. Rosen, 716 
F.3d 691, 699–700 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 175. See Olen, supra note 139, at 244–45 (arguing that the plain language of § 666 
impliedly requires proof of a quid pro quo). 
 176. 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 177. Id. at 520 (“By its terms, [§ 666] does not require the government to prove that 
Abbey contemplated a specific act when he received the bribe.”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. 713 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 180. Id. at 1001. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 996; see also United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that while proof of a quid pro quo is sufficient to prove a violation of § 666, it is not 
necessary). 
 184. 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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payment be solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official 
act.”185  The court held that § 666 does not require “that the government 
allege or prove an intent that a specific payment was solicited, received, or 
given in exchange for a specific official act, termed a quid pro quo.”186  
Therefore, the government need only prove that the recipient had “an intent 
to corruptly influence or to be influenced ‘in connection with any business’ 
or ‘transaction’” of the applicable government or agency.187 
Thus, the division between the circuit courts on the issue of whether the 
text of § 666 requires prosecutors to prove a quid pro quo, including an 
“official act,” is apparent.  Whether, and to what extent, McDonnell will 
impact future Hobbs Act extortion and § 666 prosecutions requires an 
analysis of that case, its facts, and its procedural posture. 
IV.  MCDONNELL:  CLARITY ON HOBBS ACT EXTORTION 
QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT? 
Having discussed the trajectory of the Court’s interpretation of Hobbs 
Act extortion and § 666 quid pro quo requirements, the importance of the 
central issue in McDonnell’s prosecution—the meaning and reach of 
“official act” as applied to the former governor’s Hobbs Act extortion 
conviction—is clear. 
A.  Virginia Governor Received More Than $175,000 
from Pharmaceutical CEO 
Former Governor Bob McDonnell began his political career in Virginia’s 
House of Delegates, where he served for nearly fifteen years.188  Beginning 
in 2006, McDonnell served as the state’s attorney general.189  Following a 
successful tenure in that position, McDonnell was elected governor of 
Virginia in 2009.190  McDonnell’s campaign for governor focused on 
economic development and stressed the theme “Bob’s for jobs.”191 
 
 185. Id. at 1187–88. 
 186. Id. at 1188. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Kristi Oloffson, 2-Minute Bio:  Virginia Governor-Elect Bob McDonnell, TIME 
(Nov. 4, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1934361,00.html [https:// 
perma.cc/R5HD-LLHC]. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Editorial, McDonnell Speech:  Bob’s for Jobs, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 30, 
2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_4c9ab80a-f434-5710-8856-7ac46 
818ea93.html [https://perma.cc/AV7S-U7TK].  McDonnell’s first act as governor was to 
sign an executive order establishing a commission on job creation.  This executive order 
broke with thirty years of tradition in which the governor’s first act had been to issue an 
executive order banning discrimination in state employment. See Rosalind S. Helderman, 
Virginia Governor’s Anti-Bias Order Removes Language Regarding Sexual Orientation, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
02/09/AR2010020903739.html [https://perma.cc/D8FB-3YY5]. 
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During his campaign for governor, McDonnell used the private plane of 
Jonnie Williams, the CEO of Star Scientific, Inc.192  Star Scientific was 
evaluating the efficacy of a drug—anatabine—that it “wanted the Food and 
Drug Administration to classify . . . as a pharmaceutical.”193  After his 
election, Governor McDonnell met Williams for dinner to thank him for his 
generosity during the campaign.194  At dinner, Williams ordered a $5,000 
bottle of cognac and offered to purchase Mrs. McDonnell a custom Oscar 
de la Renta dress for the inauguration.195  Williams proceeded to purchase 
her $20,000 in clothes and continued to allow them use of his jet.196 
In May of 2011, Williams loaned the McDonnells $65,000 to service 
their debt and to help pay for their daughter’s wedding reception.197  The 
next day, Williams covered a $2,380.24 bill incurred by Governor 
McDonnell, his sons, and his future son-in-law at a Virginia golf club.198  In 
June, Williams sent a letter to McDonnell in which he “suggest[ed] that 
[McDonnell] use the attached protocol to initiate the ‘Virginia study’” of 
Star Scientific’s new drug at the Medical College of Virginia and the 
University of Virginia—both state universities.199 
Over the course of the summer, Williams bought the governor a new set 
of golf clubs and allowed the governor’s family use of his vacation home, 
Range Rover, and Ferrari.200  Shortly after the vacation, McDonnell 
“directed” the Commonwealth’s Secretary of Health to have his deputy 
attend a meeting about Star Scientific’s new drug at the governor’s 
mansion.201  Later that month, Williams purchased a $6,000 Rolex watch 
that he gave to the governor.202  The pattern of meetings, loans, and gifts 
continued through 2012, by which time Williams had spent more than 
$175,000 on Governor McDonnell and his family.203 
B.  Criminal Prosecution 
On January 21, 2014, the governor and his wife were indicted on 
fourteen counts, including charges of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act 
extortion under color of official right.204  At trial, McDonnell’s Hobbs Act 
extortion conviction hinged on the meaning of “official act” (i.e., whether 
the governor took money that was not due to him for the performance of his 
 
 192. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016). 
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 203. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2364. 
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official duties).205  In accordance with Fourth Circuit precedent, which 
allows for “stream of benefits” implicit quid pro quo,206 the district court 
instructed the jury that “an official action is no less official because it is one 
in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.”207  The trial 
court proceeded to define “official action” as applicable to the Hobbs Act 
extortion charge.208  The jury instruction drew heavily from § 201.209 
McDonnell challenged the jury instruction.210  In denying McDonnell’s 
renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court found that the 
“most basic definition” of “official act” is found with reference to § 201, the 
federal bribery statute.211  The court proceeded to reference Jennings, a 
§ 666 case that held that the quid pro quo requirement is satisfied “so long 
as the evidence shows a course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a 
public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the 
donor.”212  Thus, although the trial court accepted the parties’ agreement 
that “official act” should be understood with reference to § 201’s definition, 
the court reiterated that “all that must be shown is that payments were made 
with the intent of securing a specific type of official action or favor in 
return.”213 
The district court acknowledged, however, the concern that “mere 
‘[i]ngratiation and access’ may not alone create a quid pro quo 
agreement.”214  The distinction, the court found, is in the defendant’s 
subjective intent.215  The court pointed to five specific actions taken by 
McDonnell on behalf of Star Scientific on an “as opportunities ar[i]se” 
basis to support the quo component of the implicit quid pro quo standard216:  
(1) “arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials, 
who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote 
 
 205. See United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 788 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 792 
F.3d 478, vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355. 
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 207. McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 506. 
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(2010)). 
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Anatabloc”; (2) “hosting, and the defendants attending, events at the 
Governor’s Mansion designed to encourage Virginia university researchers 
to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific’s products to 
doctors for referral to their patients”; (3) “contacting other government 
officials in the [Governor’s Office] as part of an effort to encourage 
Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine”; (4) 
“promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its relationships with 
Virginia government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals 
important to Star Scientific’s business to exclusive events at the Governor’s 
Mansion; and” (5) “recommending that senior government officials in the 
[Governor’s Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss ways 
that the company’s products could lower healthcare costs.”217 
C.  McDonnell Appeals His Conviction to the Fourth Circuit 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit began by reviewing United States v. 
Birdsall218 and Sun-Diamond, two Supreme Court cases involving the 
definition of “official act.”219  Birdsall, the court explained, “stand[s] for 
the proposition that an ‘official act’ ‘may include acts that a [public servant] 
customarily performs, even if the act falls outside the formal legislative 
process.’”220  The Fourth Circuit read Sun-Diamond as dictating merely that 
“job functions of a strictly ceremonial or educational nature will rarely, if 
ever, fall within” § 201’s definition of “official act”—it “did not rule that 
receptions, public appearances, and speeches can never constitute ‘official 
acts’ within the meaning of § 201(a)(3).”221  Thus, the court found that 
§ 201’s definition of official acts “is broad enough to encompass the 
customary and settled practices of an office, but only insofar as a purpose or 
effect of those practices is to influence a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy’ that may be brought before the government.”222  
Thus, the stage was set for McDonnell’s appeal to the Supreme Court over 
whether the district court and Fourth Circuit had faithfully applied Supreme 
Court precedent and properly analyzed the official acts jury instruction. 
D.  The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the theory 
underlying both the honest services wire fraud charge and the Hobbs Act 
extortion charge “was that Governor McDonnell had accepted bribes from 
Williams.”223  Critically, the Court also acknowledged that the jury 
instruction given for “official action” was made with reference to § 201’s 
definition as had been agreed upon by the parties in the early stages of the 
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litigation.224  As such, the Court dove into the statutory construction of 
§ 201.225 
The Court stated that § 201’s “official act” requirement has two 
components:  the government must (1) “identify a ‘question, matter, cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy’ that . . . ‘may by law be brought’ before a 
public official” and (2) “prove that the public official made a decision or 
took an action ‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so.”226  Applying noscitur a sociis,227 the rule 
against superfluity,228 and its decision in Sun-Diamond, the Court found 
that although “merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling 
another official”229 does not qualify as an official action, such action “could 
serve as evidence of an agreement to take an official act.”230  While the 
action “must . . . be something specific and focused,” the official “need not 
specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the bargain,” “[n]or 
must [he] in fact intend to perform the ‘official act,’ so long as he agree[d] 
to do so.”231  Finally, the Court held, the action “may include using his 
official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official 
act.’”232 
The Court bolstered its analysis by discussing three constitutional 
concerns weighing in favor of a more “bounded interpretation of ‘official 
act’”233:  (1) too broad a reading could improperly intrude on legitimate 
relationships between elected officials and their constituents,234 (2) a broad 
reading raises fair notice and due process concerns,235 and (3) a broad 
reading raises federalism concerns over the extent to which federal 
prosecutors should police the conduct of state and local officials.236  These 
constitutional concerns are in tension with Congress’s power to regulate, 
and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that preventing quid pro quo 
corruption, as well as the appearance of such corruption, is a compelling 
government interest.237 
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In making reference to Evans, the McDonnell Court conspicuously chose 
to embrace the “specific official acts” language,238 rather than the broader 
“official acts” language relied on by many circuit courts in establishing the 
implicit quid pro quo standard outside the campaign contribution context.  
The Court also reiterated that Hobbs Act extortion includes “taking a 
bribe.”239 
Thus, notwithstanding that the case revolved around construction of 
§ 201 and can be read not to apply in cases where § 201’s definition is not 
invoked, McDonnell provides that to fulfill the quid pro quo requirement, 
the quo (i.e., the official act) need not be explicit, but it must be “specific 
and focused.”240  Moreover, the prosecuted official need not specify the 
“means that he will use to perform” the official act, nor must he actually 
fulfill the official act so long as he agrees to do so.241  This raises the 
question:  Does the implicit quid pro quo standard of “stream of benefits” or 
“as opportunities arise” survive the decision?  And if so, does McDonnell 
sound the end of the implicit quid pro quo standard in all bribery 
prosecutions or only Hobbs Act extortion and honest services wire fraud—
the two statutes at issue in the case? 
V.  POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF MCDONNELL BY THE LOWER COURTS 
AND THEIR EFFECT ON FUTURE FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 
OF STATE AND LOCAL CORRUPTION 
Prior to McDonnell, the following framework was in place:  § 666 federal 
bribery could, in some circuits, be proven without a quid pro quo 
showing;242 Hobbs Act extortion could, in most circuits, be proven with an 
implicit “stream of benefits” quid pro quo if the alleged bribe was not 
received in the course of a campaign;243 and § 201 bribery always required 
an explicit quid pro quo.244  There are three plausible judicial 
interpretations of McDonnell that can help shed light on how the decision 
will affect the existing framework going forward. 
A.  Courts May Interpret McDonnell Broadly 
to Apply to All Federal Antibribery Statutes, 
Including Both Hobbs Act Extortion and § 666 Bribery 
To avoid the constitutional concerns raised in McDonnell, lower courts 
may err on the side of caution and read the language in McDonnell as 
broadly requiring a specific quid pro quo for all theories of bribery, 
including § 666 and Hobbs Act extortion.  In United States v. Pomrenke,245 
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the District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied defendant’s 
motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the McDonnell decision.246  
Despite the fact that “[t]he issue in the McDonnell decision was ‘the proper 
interpretation of the term “official act” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 201,’”247 the 
court applied the McDonnell definition in upholding defendant’s § 666 
conviction.248 
But this view is constrained to those circuits, like the Fourth Circuit in 
which the Western District of Virginia resides (and in which McDonnell’s 
prosecution took place), that require a quid pro quo in § 666 prosecutions 
and define the quo component as an “official action.”249  Absent that link, 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the meaning of “official act” in Sun-
Diamond and McDonnell is less obviously applicable to § 666.  Those 
courts of appeals that do not require a quid pro quo showing in § 666 
prosecutions250 would have to overturn existing circuit precedent and hold 
that the language of § 666 does require proof of a quid pro quo—including 
an official act—despite the absence of such express requirements in the text 
of § 666 and McDonnell’s silence regarding § 666. 
This interpretation has the advantage of uniformity but is unlikely to be 
widely adopted in the absence of a more express statement by the Supreme 
Court. 
B.  Courts May Interpret McDonnell as Requiring 
a Specific Quid Pro Quo in Hobbs Act Extortion Prosecutions 
but Not in § 666 Prosecutions 
The trial courts may reasonably apply the McDonnell definition of 
“official act” to Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions but not to § 666 
prosecutions.  Congress knows how to require quid pro quo, and it knows 
how to define “official act.”  One commentator has noted that “[e]quating 
the language of § 666 with that in § 201(b) . . . ignores the textual 
differences” that exist between the statutes.251  Section 666 covers those 
who “influence or reward,”252 while § 201(b) covers only those transactions 
intended to “influence . . . official acts.”253  Applying § 201’s quid pro quo 
standard to § 666 without the textual support to do so flies in the face of the 
rule against superfluous language.254  Moreover, as then-Judge Sotomayor 
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noted in Ganim, to define “official act” in the context of Hobbs Act 
extortion and § 666 as something “identified and directly linked to a benefit 
at the time the benefit is received” goes too far.255 
An additional argument in favor of the view that the McDonnell Court’s 
construction of § 201 “official act” should not be read into the text of § 666 
is that § 201 itself contains two statutory alternatives to the official act 
requirement.256  By its terms, § 201 does not require the prosecuted official 
to have corruptly received something of value in return for an official act to 
be guilty of § 201 bribery.257  In the alternative, a federal officer may be 
charged with corruptly receiving something of value in return for “being 
influenced to commit . . . any fraud . . . on the United States”258 or “being 
induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of [his or her] official 
duty.”259  If McDonnell is found to apply to all future Hobbs Act extortion 
and § 666 cases, the courts should consider these alternatives, which appear 
to undercut the force of the reasoning in McDonnell. 
Because of the facial textual differences, the existing circuit precedent 
distinguishing § 666 from § 201, and the lack of specificity by the Court in 
terms of the opinion’s applicability, this is the likely construction of 
McDonnell, particularly in those circuits that do not require a quid pro quo 
showing in § 666 prosecutions. 
C.  Courts May Treat the McDonnell Decision Like Sun-Diamond 
and Decline to Apply the Court’s Statutory Interpretation of § 201 
“Official Acts” to Hobbs Act Extortion or § 666 Bribery 
The lower courts could decline to apply McDonnell to future Hobbs Act 
extortion prosecutions on the grounds that the opinion is distinguishable on 
its facts and procedural history.  As discussed, the parties agreed to define 
“official acts” with reference to § 201—a decision that the Court accepted 
but did not hold is necessary in future prosecutions.260  This interpretation 
would mark a continuation of the position taken by several courts of 
appeals in declining to extend the Sun-Diamond clarification of § 201 
“official acts” to § 666.261  The position is especially strong with respect to 
§ 666 because that statute was not at issue in the case and the Court did not 
mention it.  Viewed in this light, McDonnell may prove to be little more 
than a reiteration of past precedent. 
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Shortly after the Supreme Court decided McDonnell, Sheldon Silver, the 
former Speaker of the New York State Assembly, applied to have the 
Southern District of New York grant him bail while his case was on 
appeal.262  Silver was found guilty of, among other things, committing 
honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion under color of official 
right.263  Although the court granted Silver’s request, it noted that 
McDonnell “did not hold that section 201(a)(3) . . . necessarily had to be the 
source for the definition of official action . . .  in the quid pro quo 
requirements of . . . extortion under color of official right.”264  The court 
went on to explain that “[i]n beginning its analysis, the [Supreme] Court 
incorporated the federal bribery statute’s definition of official act into the 
bribery requirement for . . . [Hobbs Act] extortion without explaining why it 
was doing so.”265  Thus, while § 201’s “official act” definition was 
sufficient to pass constitutional muster, “the [Supreme] Court did not 
address whether a different definition . . . could likewise allay the Court’s 
constitutional concerns.”266 
If this rationale is accepted by the Second Circuit on appeal, it seems 
likely that prosecutors will continue to “exercise [their] prerogative to 
prosecute [Hobbs Act extortion and honest services fraud] without any 
reference to Section 201’s now-narrow definition of ‘official acts.’”267  In 
an opinion without precedential effect, however, the Second Circuit has 
hinted that it may apply McDonnell’s requirement of a specific quid pro 
quo to all Hobbs Act extortion and honest services wire fraud prosecutions 
but was silent as to § 666 because the defendant was not charged with that 
crime.268 
Thus, there are three possible interpretations of the opinion, each with its 
own set of advantages and drawbacks.  As discussed below, courts should 
adopt a bounded interpretation of McDonnell to avoid creating unnecessary 
and polarizing division between Hobbs Act extortion and § 666. 
VI.  IN DEFENSE OF A BOUNDED INTERPRETATION OF MCDONNELL 
A broad interpretation of McDonnell, consisting of its application of a 
specific official act in all Hobbs Act and § 666 bribery cases, is appealing in 
many ways.  Because § 666 criminalizes virtually the same behavior as 
Hobbs Act extortion, the same governance, federalism, and due process 
concerns that motivated the Court in McDonnell should apply equally to 
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§ 666.  Such a construction would provide uniformity in jury instructions 
and a common meaning of bribery that might help with constitutional notice 
and due process concerns.  A broad interpretation would also ensure that 
whatever constitutional concerns exist over the infringement of states’ 
rights by federal prosecutors are limited and clearly defined.  A broad 
application of McDonnell also has the benefit of minimizing the federal 
government’s intrusion into the relationships between state and local 
officials and their constituents. 
Moreover, a broad application of McDonnell squares with the proposition 
that the Court is attempting to overcome the statutory differences and create 
uniformity.269  In addition to McDonnell arguably creating a quid pro quo 
standard applicable to all federal bribery theories, the Court recently ruled 
in Ocasio v. United States270 that a civilian bribe payor—not just the bribed 
official—could be prosecuted for and convicted of conspiracy to commit 
extortion “under color of official right.”271  This ruling dismantles a critical 
distinction that existed between § 666 and Hobbs Act extortion in some 
circuits.  Despite these benefits, such an interpretation is untenable given 
the existing bribery framework. 
A.  The Problems Inherent in Applying McDonnell 
to Hobbs Act Extortion but Not to § 666 
Limiting McDonnell to its facts and narrowly construing it to apply only 
to § 201 is preferable to creating a dichotomy between Hobbs Act extortion 
and § 666, in which the former requires a quid pro quo with a specific 
official act, and the latter (in some circuits) requires only corrupt intent with 
no quid pro quo requirement at all.  Because of the unique procedural 
posture of the case, where the litigants “agreed” they would define the 
“official act” element of Hobbs Act extortion with reference to § 201,272 
distinguishing the case in much the same way as the Ganim Court 
distinguished Hobbs Act extortion from Sun-Diamond273 should be 
relatively straightforward. 
If courts are to take this position, they must adequately address the 
constitutional concerns raised by McDonnell.  This can be accomplished 
short of requiring a specific quid pro quo in every Hobbs Act extortion and 
§ 666 prosecution.  By weighing the due process, federalism, and notice 
concerns expressed by the Court, lower courts can adopt jury instructions to 
ensure that prosecutions stay within constitutional bounds. 
Before the lower courts read McDonnell to apply more broadly, the 
Supreme Court should first resolve the existing problematic circuit split 
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over whether § 666 requires proof of a quid pro quo.274  Absent such 
clarification, a more onerous standard for proving Hobbs Act extortion will 
do very little because § 666 is more than capable of filling the void and 
effectively relegating Hobbs Act extortion to only the most clear-cut 
instances of state and local bribery. 
In the interim, before the Court is able to resolve the § 666 circuit split, 
there are benefits of a lower quid pro quo standard worth considering.  
Corrupt public officials and those who corruptly provide them with things 
of value do not carry out their business in an open and explicit way:  
oftentimes there is an “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine 
agreement,” negotiated with so-called “winks and nods.”275 
Whatever the legitimate policy and constitutional concerns weighing 
against continuation of the implicit quid pro quo standard, it should be 
noted that soon after Governor McDonnell’s conviction, the Virginia 
legislature amended its disclosure laws and lowered the threshold for 
accepting gifts from $250 to $100 to help solve the “Johnnie Williams 
problem.”276  In just the few months before that law went into effect, the 
number of lawmakers who reported accepting gifts in excess of fifty dollars 
dropped by 15 percent.277 
B.  The “Stream of Benefits” Quid Pro Quo Standard 
Is Worth Protecting Until the Supreme Court 
Issues a More Definitive Statement on Its Continued Existence 
As Justice Stevens understood when he wrote his dissenting opinion in 
McCormick, subtle forms of extortion and bribery are “just as wrongful—
and probably much more common—than the kind of express 
understanding” that McDonnell seems to envision.278  This 
acknowledgement was repeated again a year later by Justice Kennedy, 
when he wrote in Evans about the inadequacy of an explicit quid pro quo 
standard to root out corruption facilitated by “knowing winks and nods.”279 
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Beyond clarifying the meaning of “official act” as codified in § 201 and 
applied in McDonnell’s prosecution, the Court in McDonnell impliedly 
sanctioned the former governor’s actions and laid a blueprint for would-be 
corrupt state and local politicians to sell their influence for personal 
pecuniary gain.  Before the lower courts open the floodgates and allow such 
activity to occur unchecked by the federal government, they should 
interpret the McDonnell opinion holistically and seek to understand it in the 
context of the cases that have come before it. 
Understanding McDonnell not to apply to § 666 is natural, especially in 
those courts of appeals with no § 666 quid pro quo requirement.  Because 
applying McDonnell to Hobbs Act extortion is avoidable, the lower courts 
should take that course of action.  To do otherwise would be to judicially 
repeal Hobbs Act extortion and render the very real and serious 
constitutional concerns raised in McDonnell meaningless.  Section 666 
would still persist, and Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions would, practically 
speaking, cease to exist. 
C.  An Illustration:  What If McDonnell Was Re-charged 
with Committing § 666 Bribery Instead of Hobbs Act Extortion 
and Federal Funds Bribery? 
As discussed in the introduction of this Note, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Eastern District of Virginia declined to re-charge the former 
governor.280  This result is unsurprising in light of the Fourth Circuit’s 
Jennings decision.281  Because that court interpreted § 666 with reference to 
§ 201 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sun-Diamond, it held that a quid 
pro quo, including an official act, is required to prove § 666 federal 
bribery.282 
Had McDonnell been charged in a state within the Sixth, Ninth, Seventh, 
or Eleventh Circuits, however, prosecutors would not be required to prove 
any official act to convict him of § 666 federal bribery.283  The government 
and the courts would, therefore, have a strong basis on which to re-charge 
Governor McDonnell on the same facts without running afoul of the 
McDonnell decision because it made no mention of § 666.  Of course, 
McDonnell could be interpreted broadly to require proof of a specific 
official act in all bribery cases, including § 666 cases.  But because 
McDonnell was charged with committing honest services wire fraud and 
Hobbs Act extortion, the underlying assumption of the case was that “[t]o 
convict the McDonnells of bribery, the Government was required to show 
that Governor McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an ‘official act’ 
in exchange for the loans and gifts.”284  In those courts of appeals that do 
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not require proof or a quid pro quo in § 666 prosecutions, the analysis that 
follows from that assumption is largely inapplicable. 
Instead, a court would merely have to satisfy itself that McDonnell had 
“an intent to corruptly influence or to be influenced ‘in connection with any 
business’ or ‘transaction’”285 related to the Virginia government and that 
such a showing does not run afoul of the broad constitutional concerns 
raised in McDonnell.  In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, the court 
specifically held that although “many § 666 bribery cases will involve an 
identifiable and particularized official act, . . . [it] is not required to 
convict.”286  Thus, given the current framework of federal antibribery 
statutes, the disunity among the courts of appeals regarding the quid pro 
quo standard for bribery can be expected to grow if McDonnell is not 
limited to its facts and procedural posture. 
CONCLUSION 
A broad application of McDonnell as applied to future Hobbs Act 
extortion and § 666 prosecutions must be rejected in favor of a more limited 
reading that allows the courts and prosecutors to develop constitutionally 
acceptable alternatives to grafting § 201’s “official act” definition onto the 
Hobbs Act and § 666.  Doing so will not run afoul of the Constitution, 
because practical alternatives to the § 201 definition exist.  Applying a more 
limited reading of McDonnell will also prevent further disunity among the 
circuits in prosecuting bribery by state and local officials.  Moreover, 
failure to do so will likely result in the demise of the “stream of benefits” 
implicit quid pro quo standard, which was developed to prevent the most 
pernicious and undetectable forms of corruption undertaken by 
sophisticated parties to the detriment of the taxpaying public. 
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